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InTeRnAl lAbOR MARkeTs UnDeR exTeRnAl 
MARkeT PRessURes
JeOng-YeOn lee*
Through an empirical investigation of 11 korean firms before and 
after the Asian financial crisis, the author examines the impact of 
increasing external market pressures on internal labor market 
(IlM) practices. In addition, the merits of IlMs are tested by captur-
ing the reactions of white-collar managers within these firms. The 
author posits that 1) firms may desert IlM practices in the face of 
external pressures but do so in varying degrees, and 2) despite re-
duced values placed on firm-specific human capital in the market-
place, IlM practices continue to have merit in promoting 
consummate cooperation and delaying perfunctory cooperation. 
The findings generally support the hypotheses, and implications of 
these results for theory and practice are discussed.
since Doeringer and Piore’s (1971) seminal work, many labor economists and organization theorists have researched factors that give rise to the attri-
butes of internal labor markets (IlMs) (Pfeffer and Cohen 1984). economists 
have interpreted IlMs as a joint investment between employer and employees 
in firm-specific skills (Doeringer and Piore 1971), focusing their attention on 
the incentive aspects of IlM practices. sociologists, institutional economists, 
and organizational theorists, by contrast, have paid attention to the institutional 
characteristics of IlMs. That is, organizations often bureaucratize employment 
relations rather than rely on the external labor market because it cannot always 
provide the skills that the firm needs (Ouchi 1980; Adler and borys 1996). such 
bureaucratization involves developing and practicing internal standards for hir-
ing, training, promoting, and rewarding employees, thereby creating an inter-
nal labor market. IlMs are a constellation of these firm practices that promote 
the accumulation of firm-specific human capital. They typically include the fol-
lowing features: seniority-based rewards (Doeringer and Piore 1971; gerhart 
and Rynes 2003; Dulebohn and Werling 2007), long-term employment (Do-
eringer and Piore 1971; gerhart and Rynes 2003), on-the-job training (Do-
eringer and Piore 1971; Pfeffer and Cohen 1984; gerhart and Rynes 2003), and 
promotion from within (Althauser and kalleberg 1981).
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One of the clearest patterns in the contemporary employment relation-
ship in the Western world, and increasingly in other nations that have opted 
for full participation in the global economy, is the disintegration of IlMs in 
the face of external market pressures (Abraham 1990; Cappelli 1995; Horan 
2004). global competition and restructuring and external shocks such as 
the financial crisis in Asia and the global recession of the early 2000s exacer-
bated this process (Osterman 2008). According to Royal and Althauser 
(2003), market-based arrangements once dominant in the 1800s and 1900s 
(Jacoby 1984) have apparently returned. Royal and Althauser even argued 
that the theory of internal labor markets is “now questionable” (2003: 26) 
and that the benefits of IlM theory might have been overstated. Others 
have called for further research to fully investigate the efficacy of IlMs in a 
changing world (Osterman and burton 2004).
The competitive and volatile global environment indeed challenges the logic 
of IlM theory but at the same time opens up a research opportunity. given this 
context, I address two important research questions. First, to what extent have 
firms changed their IlM practices in response to changes in external markets? 
Particularly, have they responded in a uniform pattern or in varying degrees? 
Although previous research has qualitatively described the disintegration of 
IlMs, few studies have attempted to measure the extent of change or to address 
which firms may differ in retaining or deserting IlM practices when they face 
the same level of external pressures or shocks. second, when firms retain IlM 
practices, what do IlMs mean to employees, particularly managers whose 
employment relationships are in transition? specifically, given the increasing 
challenge of market-based arrangements to internal labor markets, how do 
employees react to a firm’s retention of IlM practices?
The current study examines the possibility that although the once-prevalent 
practices of IlMs may be disappearing as a result of external pressures, these 
practices continue to have merit by encouraging employees to remain commit-
ted to the firm and delaying the onset of what is termed perfunctory cooperation 
(Williamson, Wachter, and Harris 1975)—that is, instrumental behavior.
Background and Theoretical Development
IlM theory has never commanded a perfect consensus among scholars 
regarding the prevalence or merits of adopting these practices. One appar-
ent pattern observed in the global economy, however, is the soaring level of 
external pressures that discourage the use of IlMs. In Western economies, 
these pressures include the rise in part-time work (Abraham and Taylor 
1996; segal and sullivan 1997); the considerable decline in job security 
(batt 1996; gordon 1996; smith 1997; Aaronson and sullivan 1998; schmidt 
1999); and the increase in the use of restructuring, outsourcing, and down-
sizing due to heightened global competition (Osterman 2000, 2008; Fried-
man 2005). In Asia, such as in Japan and korea, research shows that job 
security and lifetime employment practices are also breaking down (kuwa-
hara 2010; Park and legget 2010). Criticism of seniority-based rewards has 
risen along with an increase in the use of part-time workers.
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Often external market pressures come as a sudden external shock in a time 
of economic crisis. The korean economy, which experienced such a shock 
shortly after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, serves as the empirical context of 
this study. The crisis led to direct pressure by the International Monetary 
Fund program on korean firms to reform and restructure operations so that 
resources could be more quickly and efficaciously reallocated in response to 
signals from the external economy. As a result, korean manufacturing firms 
began the process of structural and managerial reforms that would consider-
ably decrease the extent to which they relied on IlMs (see the details in kim 
and kim 2003). Despite similar trends in many national economies, a systemic 
description of institutional changes in retaining or deserting IlMs in a time 
of crisis and subsequent consequences has not been a subject of scrutiny in 
the scholarly literature. It is important to understand how firms made choices 
in terms of retaining or deserting IlMs in response to changes in external 
markets. It is not clear, for example, whether they uniformly gave in to exter-
nal pressures or whether there were varying degrees of retention. Addition-
ally, it is important to examine the consequences of varying choices.
The existing IlM literature is somewhat limited in providing answers to 
these questions because the majority of studies have focused on the evolution-
ary process of how and why firms adopted IlMs. Thus, IlMs are treated mostly 
as an optimal outcome rather than as predictors of relevant firm outcomes. Most 
studies have investigated what leads to the use of IlMs or whether employees 
are indeed compensated according to IlM principles (Pfeffer and Cohen 
1984; sheets and Ting 1988; Davis-blake and Uzzi 1993). Institutional econo-
mists and industrial relations scholars have focused on the historical context 
and role of institutions in shaping the IlM phenomenon (Jacoby 1984, 2004) 
(kanter 1984; Ryan 1984). The studies have viewed IlMs as rational coopera-
tive systems among employers and employees (Jacoby 2004) and have focused 
mainly on the existence and confirmation of the IlM phenomenon.
The evolutionary perspective has contributed to our understanding of why 
IlMs emerged in the first place, but given the abundant research on IlM evo-
lution and the ever-growing external pressures on IlMs, it is time to shift the 
focus of research. Instead, it may be more useful to investigate how employers 
reorganize their IlM practices in the face of external market pressures, and 
how employees in turn respond to employer actions. In investigating employee 
responses, the current study focuses on white-collar managers1 to help reduce 
 1Osterman (1987) suggested that different IlM systems may exist depending on different occupa-
tional groups. specifically, he identified four different IlM subsystems within firms: industrial, salaried, 
craft, and secondary. Although most of the economics and industrial relations research has emphasized 
blue-collar workers, a group in which the industrial subsystem is most often used, the current research 
focuses on the salaried model for white-collar managers, which is considered to have more flexible 
administrative procedures and greater commitment to employment security. According to kanter (1993), 
clearly defined job ladders and promotion sequences, which are the major traits in the industrial subsys-
tem, are often absent in the salaried model. Ryan (1984) also pointed out that transferable general skills 
may be more important for managers. because of this variation in IlMs across occupations, I chose to 
focus on only one occupational group—white-collar managers. In addition, before the Asian financial 
crisis, white-collar managers in korea (the sample of the current study) were characterized as having 
much more rigid external job mobility and less flexible administrative procedures than managers in the 
United states (Jung and Cheon 2006).
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“noise” and isolate the phenomena of interest. because IlMs can be both a 
firm-specific and an occupation-specific phenomenon (Osterman 1987), hold-
ing the occupation constant (i.e., to white-collar managers) allows me to focus 
on variation in IlMs among firms rather than among occupations.
External Pressures and Firm Choices in the Use of ILMs
In response to external pressures, firms may desert IlM practices entirely. 
In this case, we would observe a similar decline in the use of IlM practices 
across all firms. For example, national data show an overall decline in orga-
nizational tenure and wage premiums on tenure, suggesting that firms have 
substantially reduced IlM practices in the face of external market pressures 
over the last two decades (Chauvin 1994; Osterman 2008). What is less clear 
is how firms may vary in conceding to such pressures.
Ironically, the globalization of labor markets may increase the variation in 
IlM attributes across firms. On the one hand, many firms may have become 
skeptical about the viability of IlM practices. global pressures to compete 
on innovation and time to market have placed a premium on flexibility and 
adaptability. Also, global competition exerts pressure on firms to contain or 
reduce costs, including those of labor, and changes in markets and technol-
ogy render many forms of skill and knowledge superfluous, outdated, or 
suddenly overpriced in the context of internal labor markets, as in Oster-
man’s (2008) example of IbM. In these conditions, leaders may be less likely 
to feel the need to retain the high level of cooperation from employees that 
is developed through IlMs, and they may be loath to commit even implicitly 
to long-term relationships with subordinates. Instead, they are likely to con-
centrate resources on the acquisition of cooperation based on highly spe-
cialized expertise that commands a premium in the global external labor 
market. As a result, some firms will consider employment security a vestige 
of a time long past (e.g., Cappelli 1999).
On the other hand, some firms may have rediscovered the value of long-
term cooperation and may even see it as essential for organizational survival 
under the globalization of labor markets. Having found that procurement of 
such cooperation is not easy when employment relationships are externalized, 
these firms may decide to adhere to IlM principles. For example, despite 
external pressures, some authors (e.g., Pfeffer 2010) advocated no-layoff prom-
ises and long-term employment (i.e., employment security), which is one of 
the major features of IlMs (Doeringer and Piore 1971; gerhart and Rynes 
2003). Thus, globalization may induce firms to reshape their channels of orga-
nizing employment relations to either retain or desert IlM attributes, result-
ing in a variety of overall IlM practices among firms. In an economy shaped by 
external market pressures and globalization, I propose the following:
Proposition 1: The extent to which IlMs are employed by firms will decrease 
under external market pressures, but the extent to which IlM employ-
ment varies among firms will increase.
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Consummate vs. Perfunctory Cooperation as Reactions to ILMs
The current era of the globalization of markets (including labor markets: 
Friedman 2005) provides a context for a more stringent test of IlM effi-
ciency. I argue that while the prevalence of internal labor markets may have 
declined, their merits have not. The widened variation in the use of IlMs 
across firms may create a situation in which employees are more sensitive 
and responsive to the existence of IlM practices and the benefits they pro-
vide. In other words, the incentive effects of internal labor markets on 
employee behavior are likely to be more pronounced as employees com-
pare their own employment conditions with those of others. support for the 
IlM hypothesis (and its association with cooperative employee behavior as 
explained below) can be found more often in an economy that has variation 
in the use of IlMs due to the external market pressures than in one for 
which IlMs are the norm (as in the korean Chaebols before the Asian finan-
cial crisis). Thus, I am likely to observe a strong relationship between varia-
tion in IlMs and employee cooperative behavior.
In examining the merits of IlMs, I focus on employee cooperation because 
the real benefits and limitations of internal labor markets can best be 
observed through their impact on employee behavior. In particular, in the 
advent of external market pressures, the extent to which employees are will-
ing to cooperate with firm objectives may be at risk. Williamson et al. (1975) 
distinguished between “consummate cooperation” (genuine or authentic 
cooperation) and “perfunctory cooperation” (cooperation only to the extent 
that it is sufficient to avoid censure, reprimand, or termination). Consum-
mate cooperation has much in common with the concept of “organizational 
citizenship behavior” (OCb; Organ, Podsakoff, and Mackenzie 2006) but 
with the qualification that OCb draws upon job-relevant knowledge, includ-
ing firm-specific and task-specific skills. Consummate cooperation implies a 
level of application of firm-specific skills that goes beyond the most literal or 
enforceable terms of the job description; it implies some degree of initiative 
or proactive behavior; and it is carried out without regard to mechanisms for 
metering the employee’s contributions. This type of cooperation is often 
important when workers need to combine efforts for a single outcome 
(Ouchi 1980). Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) term “cooperative efforts” 
described this well. As noted by Williamson et al. (1975):
Consummate cooperation is an affirmative job attitude—to include the use of 
judgment, filling gaps, and taking initiative in an instrumental way. Perfunctory 
cooperation, by contrast, involves job performance of a minimally acceptable 
sort. Incumbents, who through experience have acquired task-specific skills, 
need merely to maintain a slight margin over the best available inexperienced 
candidate. . . . The upshot is that workers, by shifting to a perfunctory perfor-
mance mode, are in a position to “destroy” idiosyncratic efficiency gains. (Wil-
liamson et al. 1975: 266)
The problem for organizations short on consummate cooperation is that 
while employees do what is minimally required, they may not cooperate in a 
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way that fully utilizes their accumulated firm-specific skills and knowledge 
on the job. For instance, employees within an internal hierarchy acquire 
job-relevant knowledge (i.e., understanding the personality of team mem-
bers, internal procedures for how the job is done, and unique technology 
pertinent for firm production) that may or may not be used for the benefit 
of others in the firm and for the firm itself. Only when employees use their 
knowledge to help others, share the knowledge, and take the initiative to 
improve work procedures may it be said that they are cooperating consum-
mately as opposed to perfunctorily. According to Williamson et al. (1975), 
this kind of consummate cooperation, characterized as high asset-specificity, 
cannot be obtained by hiring from external labor markets. Accordingly, it is 
consummate cooperation that may be at risk when IlMs are under external 
market pressures. Therefore, revisiting the effects of IlMs on consummate 
cooperation is an important research endeavor. When we do so, a primary 
question arises. Under external market pressures, do IlMs still induce more 
cooperation while delaying the diminishing level of cooperation that origi-
nates from accumulated firm-specific human capital?
Firm-Specific Human Capital and Consummate Cooperation
I have argued that IlMs provide incentives to increase consummate coopera-
tion and that variation in IlM practices across firms will be associated with 
variation in the level of consummate cooperation of employees across firms. 
IlM theory also addresses the issue of variation in the level of consummate 
cooperation of employees within firms. According to Williamson et al. (1975), 
as employees acquire more firm-specific human capital, they may not use 
their firm-specific knowledge unless the proper incentives and monitoring 
are in place. That is because, unlike general knowledge and skills, the acqui-
sition of firm-specific human capital creates information asymmetries, or 
what Williamson et al. (1975) call “information impactedness” between 
employees and employers. The higher the level of employees’ firm-specific 
skills, the less information employers have about those skills. This provides 
space for employees with higher firm-specific skills to engage in perfunctory 
cooperation compared to those with fewer firm-specific skills.
The effects of information impactedness are likely to increase when exter-
nal market pressures are high because they enhance uncertainty and oppor-
tunism. Under conditions of uncertainty, employers have less knowledge of 
the relative utility of firm-specific skills and employees may have more incen-
tives to increase opportunistic behavior.
Agency costs may also arise because of the divergent interests of employ-
ers (i.e., principals) and employees (i.e., agents) and information asymme-
try associated with firm-specific human capital. That is, employees know 
best how to utilize their firm-specific human capital, whereas employers 
have limited knowledge. but more important, agency problems may be 
exacerbated because monitoring mechanisms (on firm-specific human capi-
tal and employee use of it) may have been degraded along with the 
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depreciated value placed on firm-specific human capital under the influ-
ence of external market pressures.
An additional consideration is that employees who have a high level of firm-
specific human capital may feel a sense of social and psychological breach if 
employers begin to view firm-specific skills as outdated and respond to exter-
nal pressures by reducing their commitment to IlMs. Williamson et al. (1975) 
described how the adoption of market mechanisms hindered the preexisting 
voluntarism among blood donors in england. They suggested that the sudden 
external pressure or shock might have created a sense of social or psychologi-
cal contract breaches (Rousseau and Parks 1992; Robinson, kraatz, and Rous-
seau 1994; Robinson 1996) among employees. Osterman (2008) also described 
how external market pressures have led to a decline in loyalty among middle 
managers in the United states. Thus, when firms reduce their commitment to 
IlMs, those employees with a higher level of firm-specific capital, accumulated 
over many years, are likely to experience a higher level of contract breach, 
compared with employees with less accumulated tenure.
For these reasons, under heightened external market pressures, it is likely 
that, as firm-specific human capital increases, consummate cooperation will 
increase at a decreasing rate.
Hypothesis 1: There will be a curvilinear (inverted U) relationship between 
firm-specific human capital and consummate cooperation.
Retention of ILMs and Consummate Cooperation
Although the IlM literature has focused on how IlMs foster firm-specific 
skills, the increased information impactedness associated with firm-specific 
human capital under external market pressures suggests that being 
equipped with firm-specific human capital is not enough to ensure that 
employees cooperate fully in their use of their skills. Thus, they may adopt a 
more perfunctory mode of cooperation. As argued earlier, this pattern may 
be even more pronounced rather than eliminated in the face of external 
labor market pressures. As a result, a firm’s decision to retain IlMs could 
lead to a higher level of consummate cooperation than would otherwise 
occur.
several scholars have suggested that the monitoring and supervising 
function of IlMs can promote cooperation. Monitoring has both positive 
and negative aspects (niehoff and Moorman 1993; barney and Hesterly 
1999). negatively, it implies a management’s lack of trust in its workers. but 
monitoring may also function as a safeguard to ensure that a fair appraisal 
of an employee’s contribution can be made and a fair reward expected (Wil-
liamson et al. 1975). Therefore, in the long run, monitoring may raise 
employees’ expectations that cooperation will be rewarded. It is this latter 
function of monitoring to which the IlM literature pays attention. In this 
work, I use the terms supervision and monitoring interchangeably and focus 
only on the positive side of monitoring and supervision.
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Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argued that supervision reduces the likeli-
hood of diminution of effort and that a hierarchy emerges as individuals are 
assigned to supervising roles. Ouchi (1980) argued that to obtain employee 
cooperation, bureaucratization has two principal advantages over the mar-
ket. First, it uses an incomplete contract, which allows organizations to 
appoint a supervisor to direct work activities and monitor employee perfor-
mance in exchange for higher wages. The supervisor position is part of an 
internal hierarchy and is necessary for carrying out internal standards of 
hiring, promoting, and rewarding employees.
second, supervisors understand the firm-specific context better. As a result, 
Ouchi (1980) believed that “the costs associated with ensuring fair transac-
tions” (e.g., evaluating the value of cooperation, sorting out true cooperators, 
and administering fair compensation) will be smaller with supervisors. since 
both employers and employees see the joint benefits of transaction cost sav-
ings (the costs otherwise carried by the two parties) in the form of reduced 
bargaining, monitoring, and maladaptation costs (Williamson 1985: 21), the 
use of IlMs will evoke employee cooperation. For the employee, the exis-
tence of these retained IlM attributes in a time of external market pressures 
can be interpreted as an employer’s continued commitment to measure and 
compensate employee cooperation in a fair manner by using internal stan-
dards and rewarding cooperation through internal promotion.
Using the logic of transaction cost efficiency and an enhanced sense of 
fairness in transactions by “metering” (i.e., supervising—monitoring/mea-
suring and providing fair incentives) consummate cooperation, Williamson 
and his colleagues (1975: 270) believed that IlMs will provide more incen-
tives to “encourage employee cooperation.” In addition, internal labor mar-
kets often provide an internal competition: positions are awarded to the 
winners—those who show greater contributions over the long term (Fairris 
2004). not only supervision but also internal competition and peer pressure 
can provide incentives for workers to engage in consummate cooperation. 
The merits of IlMs in terms of retaining consummate cooperation will be 
more apparent under conditions of heightened external market pressures 
because employees can more easily identify how the IlM practices in their 
firm differ from others.
In addition, retaining IlMs may also minimize psychological contract 
breaches (Rousseau and Parks 1992; Robinson et al. 1994; Robinson 1996). 
between the two types of psychological contracts, transactional and rela-
tional (Robinson et al. 1994), it is the latter that IlMs may heavily influence. 
IlMs create relational contracts that involve “an open-ended, less specific 
agreement that establishes and maintains a relationship” (Robinson et al. 
1994: 138) based on long-term commitments. I argue, quite contrary to 
many market advocates, that under external market pressures the role of 
relational psychological contracts in creating consummate cooperation can 
be even more important as the relational component of the psychological 
contract may become a scarce phenomenon.
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Hypothesis 2: There will be more consummate cooperation at the same 
level of firm-specific human capital in cases for which a firm relies more 
on IlM practices.
ILMs as a Device to Delay Perfunctory Cooperation
Another potentially important advantage of internal labor markets is their 
ability to reduce the advent of perfunctory cooperation as employees 
acquire more firm-specific human capital. several studies point to the pos-
sibility that perfunctory behavior among more senior employees may be 
delayed in firms that retain some level of commitment to IlMs (compared 
to those that do not). Alchian and Demsetz (1972) have argued that a reduc-
tion of effort is not completely eliminated by hierarchy. because monitoring 
involves costs, it makes sense to monitor only to the point at which the mar-
ginal benefits from reduced consummate cooperation equal the marginal 
costs of monitoring. A strong possibility exists that perfunctory cooperation 
can still occur and is simply delayed up to a point at which marginal costs do 
not exceed the marginal benefits of monitoring.
The point of perfunctory cooperation of this sort may be delayed to a 
higher level of firm-specific skill accumulation in firms with stronger IlMs. 
First, as employees become aware that IlMs meter additional consummate 
cooperation and rewards them through internal promotion, they may per-
ceive significantly higher expectancies, particularly performance-outcome 
expectancy or instrumentality (vroom 1964). The incentives encourage 
employees to continue to make extra efforts beyond the point at which they 
would otherwise have started to reduce consummate cooperation when such 
incentives are absent. second, even though monitoring employees with high 
firm-specific skills is difficult in general, IlMs provide a better context to 
detect the reduction of consummate cooperation (Willamson et al. 1975). 
IlMs employ supervisors who have gone up the internal ladder and are con-
sidered to be in a better position to evaluate such quality (Jones 1984). There-
fore, employees who would have reduced consummate cooperation in the 
absence of an IlM will have reasons to delay this tendency to a later point 
when there are fewer people with the ability to catch the desertion. Third, 
internal competition among job incumbents within the firm puts limitations 
on the early development of the incumbent’s advantage (Malcomson 1984) 
as employees become aware that potential job replacements inside the com-
pany have a similar level of firm-specific skill and thus a similar advantage.
These advantages will still exist in retained IlMs in external market pres-
sure. As argued in Hypothesis 1, employees with high firm-specific human 
capital are likely to reduce the rate at which they increase consummate 
cooperation if they know firm-specific human capital is not valued in the 
labor market. In addition, the sense of social contract/psychological con-
tract may play a role for employees with substantial firm-specific human 
capital who have limited options to change employers. The more firms hang 
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on to IlMs in this context, the more employees will be motivated to delay 
their perfunctory cooperation. Thus I generate the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: For employees with the same level of firm-specific human cap-
ital, the point at which consummate cooperation tails off occurs later in 
firms with stronger IlMs compared to those with weaker IlMs.
The above hypothesis is depicted graphically in Figure 1. Where a firm relies 
more on IlM practices, the incentive and metering aspects of the IlM 
should encourage employees to continue to increase their cooperation 
beyond kw*; but where these incentives and metering are lower, employees 
are likely to reduce their consummate cooperation at an earlier point, 
resulting in kw* < ks*.
Methods
Procedure
To test my hypotheses, I needed a sample of firms that I had reason to 
believe had significant variation in their IlM practices and a sample of 
employees within those firms. Manufacturing firms in south korea and 
white-collar managers working in those firms met these requirements. sev-
eral advantages to the sample choice are apparent. First, as the study focuses 
on employee cooperation in response to IlMs in conjunction with firm-
specific human capital, one condition of my story is that firms first make 
decisions about the use of IlMs and then employees make decisions about 
their optimal amount of consummate cooperation given the level of their 
firm-specific human capital. This assumption is more likely to be true among 








Figure 1. Hypothesized Relationship between employee Firm-specific Human Capital and 
Consummate Cooperation at Different levels of IlM strength
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firms to reevaluate their use of IlMs; employees then had to adjust and 
respond to employers’ choices. Additionally, even though the current study 
is not longitudinal, this setting allowed me to assume that the varying 
degrees of IlM practices in place following the Asian financial crisis were a 
response to the crisis, because prior research demonstrated that large 
korean firms were quite homogenous in their adherence to IlM practices 
before the financial crisis (Jwa 2002; Chang 2003; kim and kim 2003; evans 
2007). Recall that my theoretical model of employee cooperation also 
assumes the exercise of employee discretion when firm-specific skill acquisi-
tion creates an agency issue. White-collar managers are more likely to have 
such discretion and also to have opportunities to engage in perfunctory 
cooperation because their jobs involve the accumulation of substantial 
amounts of firm-specific human capital.
I collaborated with six other professionals in economic research institutes 
affiliated with korean industrial conglomerates. The strategy was to study 
major firms selected from the top 30 Chaebols (large conglomerates) in 
korea in 1995 (Jwa 2002). before the Asian financial crisis in 1997, these 
companies were heavily dependent on IlMs (Chang 2003; evans 2007). I 
chose the five manufacturing industries most representative of the main 
businesses of these top 30 Chaebols. My sample includes two firms each from 
the automotive, chemical, electrical, and metal/plastics industries; and 
three firms from the electronics industry. each of these firms employed 
more than a thousand people (both theory and research have suggested 
that number of employees to be a correlate of IlM characteristics [baron, 
Davis-blake, and bielby 1986]).
Upon gaining access to each company, my six professional contacts 
selected teams so that I could obtain a number of respondents from func-
tional areas in proportion to the distribution of the six areas (see details 
below) in a specific firm. Teams were selected using the random number 
generator in excel. The names of all supervisors in the participating firms 
were entered into a spreadsheet. From this list, the researchers randomly 
selected team leaders who would ultimately identify participants for this 
study. After the supervisors were selected, the researchers delivered the sur-
veys to participating firms. supervisors were requested to distribute surveys 
to all team members or, when there were more than 15 members, to ran-
domly identify a subset for participation (using the random selection proce-
dure described above). Most of the surveys were delivered in person to the 
supervisors, but a small portion were sent by mail.
The envelopes that the supervisors received contained two survey forms—
one for the supervisor, the other for subordinates. The supervisor form con-
tained items denoting the functional area and descriptive statements about 
the consummate cooperation of designated subordinates. Items on the sub-
ordinate forms elicited information pertaining to tenure and number of jobs 
held within the firm and demographic factors such as age, education, and 
marital status. surveys were coded to permit matching data points. All survey 
instruments were developed in english but later formatted into korean using 
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the translation-back procedure (sinaiko and brislin 1973). A pilot test 
employing these measures was conducted for 124 employees in early 2004.
between september and november of 2004, surveys went to 800 employ-
ees in the 11 firms. Completed forms were received from 657 employees, for 
a response rate of 82%. Missing data reduced the usable data set to 624 par-
ticipants. I ran several t-tests to see if there were any major differences 
between respondents with no missing data and those with missing data in 
terms of their major demographics (age, tenure, education, and number of 
positions held within the firm), but I did not find significant differences. The 
respondents were predominantly male (75%), highly educated (nearly 80% 
having four years or more of higher education), and drawn from marketing 
(31.4%), research and development (R&D) (22.8%), finance (20.0%), pro-
duction (13.9%), other functional areas (8.2%), and human resource man-
agement (HRM) (3.7%), in order of frequency. The data also came from the 
11 firms in a relatively even manner (9.4% on average and median is 8%) 
ranging from 3 to 19%. The sample came from five manufacturing indus-
tries: automobile (21%), chemical (19%), electrics (21%), electronics 
(31%), and metal/plastics (8%). The average age of the respondents was 35 
years, ranging from 22 to 55. The average tenure within an organization was 
6.4 years, ranging from 0.1 to 24 years. A major portion of the sample was 
composed of low- to middle-level managers (35.3% junior managers, 31.4% 
assistant managers, 26.3% section/deputy managers, 6.7% managers, and 
0.3% directors). As expected in a group with a strong managerial dimension 
and high levels of postsecondary schooling, very few participants (fewer than 
10%) belonged to a union. More than 92% worked full-time.
I sent out a separate survey to managers in human resources (HR) depart-
ments in the 11 firms to capture firm-level IlM practices. For each firm, 
with the help of the aforementioned contacts, I initially identified two or 
three senior-level managers in the HR area. I selected only managers who 
had worked for their company for at least eight years (i.e., during the period 
of 1996–2004) so that they were in a position to provide an accurate descrip-
tion of IlM practices before and after the korean financial crisis that 
occurred at the end of 1997. I personally contacted the selected managers 
and invited them to participate in the survey. After I assured confidentiality 
of individuals and firms and guaranteed that the data would be used for the 
sole purpose of research, two individuals from each firm agreed to partici-
pate in the survey. The surveys sent out to these individuals were designed 
to obtain information on the IlMs their particular firm implemented in 
2004 and 1996, respectively.
Measures
Employee-Level Variables
To establish control variables in the analysis, as well as to gather the infor-
mation needed to index an employee’s firm-specific human capital invest-
ment in an employment relationship with the current employer (see below), 
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I asked respondents to provide information about gender, education, tenure, 
number of positions held within the firm, marital status, union membership, employ-
ment status (part time vs. full time), and functional area of employment. I also 
controlled for industry as an individual-level predictor because industry 
characteristics may affect the way employees engage in consummate coop-
eration. In addition, because of the relatively small number of firms used in 
the study, if I had controlled for industry as a dummy variable at the firm 
level, then the degrees of freedom would easily have been depleted. I mea-
sured promotion rate by the number of promotions acquired by the employ-
ees divided by the years of service and included this as a control variable.
Consummate cooperation was assessed by supervisors, who indicated the 
degree to which they agreed with nine statements for a specific employee. 
supervisors were considered the best source of information on consummate 
cooperation. because they had risen through internal job ladders and 
understood the job and firm context, they could effectively evaluate the 
quality of cooperation (Jones 1984). I developed and validated the consum-
mate cooperation scale following the procedures recommended by experts 
in scale development (spector 1992; netemeyer, bearden, and sharma 
2003).2 An exploratory factor analysis (eFA) suggested that the nine con-
summate cooperation items rated by the supervisor initially contained three 
distinct factors: helping with knowledge (using knowledge to help cowork-
ers); knowledge utilization (the use of knowledge to solve work-relevant 
problems); and knowledge sharing (teaching or coaching coworkers). How-
ever, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) shown in Table 1 supported the 
presence of a second-order factor on which all three of the first-order fac-
tors loaded. The two-level solution yielded a good fit (χ2 = 114.12, df = 24, 
CFI = .98, GFI = .96, RMSEA = .07, SRMR = .03) with a coefficient alpha of .90 
for the composite measure of consummate cooperation (CC). Thus, for CC, 
second-order factor scores used in the analysis represent a summation of all 
three first-order factors. A complete list of the scale items and psychometric 
properties of the measure is presented in Table 1.
I indexed employee’s firm-specific human capital by combining two items of 
information about subordinates: years of tenure with the firm and number 
of different, distinct positions or jobs held during their years of tenure exclu-
sively with the current employer. The assumption guiding the choice of 
these two measures was that an employee’s firm-specific human capital 
investment results from both the length of time a person spends with a par-
ticular firm and the opportunity to see varied aspects of the firm and its 
operations from the point of view of different jobs. lateral job mobility as 
well as vertical job mobility have been found to be important in internal 
labor market careers (Dohmen, kriechel, and Pfann 2004). I standardized 
 2I generated the initial items and had their relevance judged by two leading academicians in the area 
of organizational citizenship behavior to ensure that the items differed enough from existing OCb 
scales. next, I examined dimensionality and internal consistency and conducted a construct validity 
assessment with a pilot test sample of 124 korean employees in a setting similar to that used in my study 
sample. Coefficient alpha from the pilot test was .89.
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each of the measures into z-scores and summed the two normal deviates to 
provide the index. These two measures correlated at r = .616.
I included several control variables to rule out potential alternative hypoth-
eses. because the rate of increase of cooperation may decrease as a result of 
the aging process, I controlled for both age and age squared. Also possible is 
that the generation of employees who entered the employment relationship 
before the Asian financial crisis could engage in consummate cooperation as 
a response to experiencing two extreme—strong and weak—attributes of 
IlMs operated by the employer. I included a five-item job interdependence mea-
sure by Pearce and gregersen (1991) because the extent to which a job 
requires coordination with others rather than an employee’s discretionary 
cooperative effort could be related to the level of cooperation. Illustrative 
items of job interdependence included “I frequently must coordinate my 
efforts with others”; “My own performance is dependent on receiving accu-
rate information from others”; and “My work requires me to consult with 
others fairly frequently.” I used job satisfaction as a control variable because 
satisfaction in the workplace may explain consummate cooperation. I used a 








on the second- 
order factor
Consummate cooperation (Second-order factor)
 Knowledge utilization — .97
  CC1 Uses his/her judgment to identify and solve 
a work-related problem instead of leaving 
it for others to solve
.71 —
  CC2 goes one step further to use his/her job-
relevant knowledge to suggest a solution 
to a common work problem
.79 —
  CC3 Uses his/her job knowledge to suggest 
improvements in the way the work is done 
in my work unit
.70 —
  CC4 Uses his/her job knowledge to identify an 
ineffective work procedure or practice
.77 —
 Helping with job-relevant knowledge — .88
  CC5 Draws upon his/her job knowledge to 
“cover” for somebody who is absent
.82 —
  CC6 Utilizes his/her job knowledge to help 
inexperienced coworkers
.86 —
 Knowledge sharing — .90
  CC7 shares his/her experience with others to 
improve work unit performance
.88 —
  CC8 shares his/her knowledge with coworkers to 
improve organizational efficiency
.89 —
  CC9 shares his/her skills to improve the 
performance of others
.74 —
Notes: All estimates were significant at p < .001. Fit statistics for the measurement model of 21 indicators 
for nine constructs: χ2 = 114.12, df = 24; CFI = .98; SRMR = .03; RMSEA = .05.
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six-item scale (Tsui, egan, and O’Reilly 1992) in which respondents answered 
the following illustrative question items: “Considering everything, how satis-
fied are you with your current job situation?” “How satisfied are you with the 
person who supervises you—your organizational superior?” “How satisfied 
are you with your relations with others in the organization with whom you 
work—your coworkers or peers?” For both job interdependence and job sat-
isfaction, I used seven-point likert scales (strongly disagree to strongly 
agree). Finally, I controlled for the number of ratees by a supervisor because the 
number of subordinates that a supervisor was asked to rate may affect the 
consummate cooperation of a specific employee.
Firm-Level Variables
I included firm size as one of the firm-level control variables. The firm size is 
the log of the number of employees based on the total number of employ-
ees obtained from a corporate database provided by the korea Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry. HR managers from each company provided infor-
mation on the degree to which IlMs were in operation in their firms. The 
IlM information came from surveys that were separately distributed to HR 
managers in the 11 firms. A set of questions addressed specific IlM features 
used in the year 1996 and 2004 at each firm. To develop these measures, I 
modified the Pfeffer and Cohen (1984) approach regarding the following 
aspects: seniority-based rewards (Doeringer and Piore 1971; gerhart and 
Rynes 2003; Dulebohn and Werling 2007), long-term employment 
(Doeringer and Piore 1971; gerhart and Rynes 2003), on-the-job training 
(Doeringer and Piore 1971; Pfeffer and Cohen 1984; gerhart and Rynes 
2003), and promotion from within (Althauser and kalleberg 1981). The HR 
managers provided information about these aspects of the IlM.
With regard to the four aforementioned IlM features, the survey included 
questions from two general categories: scale Type 1, the extent to which a 
specific IlM feature is used at the firm level applies universally to all work-
ers within the firm (e.g., number of days of corporate training offered at the 
entry level), and scale Type 2, in which the use of a specific IlM policy at 
the firm level applies to a specific position (e.g., average yearly corporate 
training offered). In the case of the latter, the HR managers identified IlM 
features used for each of the six positions: junior manager, assistant manag-
ers, section manager, deputy manager, manager, and director. On the basis 
of the reported percentage of each of these positions out of the total employ-
ees of a firm, I calculated the weighted average for each IlM feature. For 
example, if the HR managers reported the existence of a certain IlM fea-
ture for the six positions—”yes (= 1), yes (= 1), yes (= 1), no (= 0), no (= 1), 
and yes (= 1),” respectively—and the percentage of those positions out of 
total employment in a firm was 40%, 30%, 20%, 7.5%, 1.5%, and 1%, respec-
tively, then I applied these weights appropriately to produce an overall per-
centage of workforce covered under the particular IlM feature: (1 x .40 + 1 
x .30 + 1 x .20 + 0 x .075 + 1 x .015 + 1 x .01 = 92.5%). The weighted average 
indicates the percentage of the workforce to which a particular IlM feature 
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applies. even though I am conceptually interested in firm-level variation in 
IlM features for a job (i.e., white-collar managers only), I asked about the 
IlM features for six different positions in order to 1) increase the level of 
accuracy of IlM features reported by HR managers, and 2) characterize the 
firm-level IlM features based on the distribution of the positions within the 
firm. I did not believe the equal weight approach was a reasonable represen-
tation of firm-level IlM features.
I measured on-the-job training by five items: 1) days of corporate training 
at entry (number of days); 2) average yearly corporate training offered 
(number of times); 3) average yearly online training offered; 4) use of cross-
functional training (1 = yes, 0 = no); and 5) official mentoring (1 = yes, 0 = 
no). I measured seniority-based rewards by four items: whether the firm 1) 
offered a pay bonus as a function of tenure (specifically, 10-year, 15-year, 
and 20-year pay bonuses); 2) offered a pay differential within each position 
based on seniority (1 = yes, 0 = no); 3) offered a benefit privilege based on 
seniority for each position (1 = yes, 0 = no); and 4) had a requirement of 
tenure or recommended number of years in one position to be promoted to 
the next position (1 = yes, 0 = no). Internal promotion was measured by 
four items: 1) the average percentage of vacancies filled internally for each 
position; 2) the average rate of promotion for each position to the next 
position; 3) whether the firm had a policy of internal advertising when there 
was a vacant position (1 = yes, 0 = no); and 4) whether the firm had a prac-
tice of filling a position with members from the same business group (1 = 
yes, 0 = no). long-term employment was measured by asking the HR man-
ager to rate 1) whether layoffs were done for a specific position in the last 
eight years (1 = yes, 0 = no); 2) whether an early retirement program was 
used for a specific position in the last eight years (1= yes, 0 = no); and finally 
3) the percentage of workforce reduction by either layoffs or an early retire-
ment program in the last eight years. since the units associated with these 
questionnaires were all different, I standardized the scores from each prac-
tice and then took the average for the global index of IlM practices.
Data Analysis
I assessed the construct validity of the key variable, employee consummate 
cooperation, by conducting both exploratory and confirmatory factor anal-
ysis. I also assessed the reliability of the measures. I used hierarchical linear 
modeling (HlM) (Raudenbush and bryk 2002) for hypothesis testing 
because the effects of IlMs at the firm level on consummate cooperation 
would be manifested at the organizational level, and individual characteris-
tics such as firm-specific human capital also affect employee cooperation at 
the individual level. All the variables were grand-mean centered except 
dummy variables (Hofmann and gavin 1998).
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Results
External Market Pressures and Firm Choices about ILMs
Table 2 provides the average of firm-level IlMs used in the 11 firms included 
in this study as reported by two HR managers from each company. because I 
aggregated the IlMs across two HR managers from each firm, I calculated the 
interclass correlation (ICC) (2), which indicates the reliability of the aggre-
gated means. The ICC (2) for 2004 IlMs and IlM change (between 2004 and 
1996), which I used in the HlM analyses, ranged from .63 to .97. These values 
are within the acceptable level for data aggregation (Mcgraw and Wong 1996; 
bliese 2000); they are also significantly larger than the corresponding ICC (1) 
values, confirming that employing more than one HR manager could improve 
the measurement reliability level (Wright et al. 2001).
There were some interesting patterns in the way IlMs were used in these 
11 firms. First, except for two particular practices (average yearly online 
training offered and official mentoring), from 1996 to 2004 the firms in this 
study decreased the strengths of IlMs by an average of 26%.3 because online 
training was not readily available and because the concept of official men-
toring was adopted into the korean economy in the late ’90s, the increase of 
these two practices is understandable. Of the 14 IlM practices that the firms 
reduced, paired sample t-tests suggested that the reduced use of the 11 prac-
tices was significant. Although firms appeared to decrease seniority-based 
compensation, the reduction of three practices associated with seniority-
based compensation was insignificant. second, the standard deviations of 
these practices among the 11 firms were much larger in 2004 than in 1996. 
On average, these firms were characterized by stronger and more uniform 
IlMs in 1996. After 1996, they differed in their desertion of IlMs, creating 
larger variance in IlM operation in 2004. In other words, firms character-
ized as having strong IlMs in 2004 retained the IlMs that were in place in 
1996, while those firms low in their 2004 use of the IlMs had deserted IlMs 
since 1996. The data suggest that firms overall reduced the use of IlMs, yet 
the heterogeneity among these firms in retaining IlMs had significantly 
increased. This serves as empirical evidence for Proposition 1.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 provides means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and intercorrela-
tions for the measures and variables used in the study. These data pertain to 
the individual level of analysis. At the individual level, consummate cooper-
ation was positively and significantly related to the use of IlM practices: (r = 
 3The percentage reduction was calculated in the following manner. First, it was calculated for 14 prac-
tices except OJT3 (use of online training) and OJT5 (use of official mentoring). For example, the reduc-
tion rate for OJT1 was (OJT11996 – OJT12004)/OJT1996, which was 23%. For lTe1R~3R, since these are 
reverse-coded items (i.e., short-term employment), I calculated the percentage of the workforce that was 
not exposed to these practices (= 100% – percentage of the workforce that was under the influence of 
lTeR). Then I took the average reduction rate of these practices by adding the reduction rates for all of 
them and dividing the total by 14.
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.21, p < .01). To check for multicollinearity, I used two measures to assess 
pair-wise and multiple-variable collinearity: tolerance and the variance infla-
tion factor (vIF). Tolerance values ranged from .42 to .97, and the vIF 
ranged from 1.06 to 2.42. small tolerance values less than .10 and vIF mea-
sures higher than 10.0 are considered to be indicators of problems with 
multicollinearity. The values in the current study did not approach those 
levels, suggesting that the data did not pose any multicollinearity problems.
HLM Hypothesis Testing
Following the recommendation by bryk and Raudenbush (1992), to test 
Hypotheses 1 to 3, I ran a two-level HlM analysis where the outcome vari-
able was consummate cooperation.
Null Model
Table 4 summarizes the results from the HlM. I hypothesized that signifi-
cant variance in consummate cooperation would be explained at both the 
organizational and individual levels. To test these hypotheses, I first had to 
ascertain that significant organizational variance in consummate coopera-
tion existed. Thus, I first estimated a null model in which consummate 
cooperation was a linear function of three parameters: the grand mean of 
the population of individuals, a random effect due to individuals, and a ran-
dom effect due to organizations. I found significant between-organization 
variability: (τ00 = .11, p < .001). The ICC indicated that 18% of the variance 
in consummate cooperation was between organizations and about 72% 
within organizations.
Model 1 in Table 4 lists HlM results in which consummate cooperation is 
regressed on all the level-1 control variables. About 14% of the within- 
organization variance of consummate cooperation was explained by the set 
of variables. The difference between ordinary least squares (Ols) regres-
sion and what is presented in Model 1 is that, in addition to the fixed effects 
(represented as regression coefficients) as in Ols regression, the HlM 
measured the random effects of the intercepts and slopes in the model. The 
random effects are listed in parentheses. In Model 2, I entered employee 
firm-specific human capital and also its squared term in the HlM equation 
along with the level-1 control variables. As a result, compared with Model 1, 
Model 2 gained a 4% additional increase in terms of the within-organization 
R-square. The squared term of firm-specific human capital was significant: 
(γ̂ = –.09, p < .01). The sign associated with it was negative, confirming that 
the relationship between firm-specific skills and consummate cooperation is 
nonlinear and resembles an inverted-U shape, supporting Hypothesis 1.
In Model 3, in addition to the level-1 predictors in Model 2, I entered a 
firm-level control: firm size. Compared with Model 2, adding the firm size 
variable resulted in an additional 24% of the between-organization R-square. 
In Model 4, in addition to firm size, I included IlMs in the HlM equation. 
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Regressing the intercept from level-1 predictors on the objective IlM prop-
erties at the firm level, in addition to firm size (level-2 control variable), 
amounts to testing Hypothesis 2, which posited a significant association 
between objective IlM properties and consummate cooperation at the 
organizational level. In this instance, objective IlM properties were signifi-
cantly related to consummate cooperation: (γ̂ = .47, p < .01). Compared with 
Model 2, the objective IlM properties explained 46% additional between-
firm variance.
In Model 5, in addition to all the variables included in Model 4, I included 
the cross-level interaction term between IlMs and employee’s firm-specific 
human capital. If the coefficient of the interaction term as well as the nega-
tive coefficient of the firm-specific human capital squared term are signifi-
cant simultaneously, they serve as evidence that the point of shirking that 
happens in organizations with weak IlM attributes (kw*) significantly differs 
from that in organizations with strong IlM attributes (ks*). Rejecting the 
null hypothesis (HO: kw* = ks*) can serve as evidence to support Hypothesis 
3. As was hypothesized, the interaction term was significantly related with 
consummate cooperation in the expected direction (γ̂ = .13, p < .01) as well 
as the squared term of firm-specific human capital (γ̂ = –.09, p < .01). Thus, 
Hypothesis 3 is supported. Compared with Model 4, an additional 3% of the 
within-firm variance and an additional 2% of between-firm variance is 
explained by the interaction term.
In Model 6, I entered all the variables found in Model 5 into the HlM 
equation, but instead of IlMs measured in 2004, I entered the change in 
the use of IlMs between 1996 and 2004 to explain the level of consummate 
cooperation measured in 2004. I assumed that firms make the first move in 
choosing the degree to which they rely on IlMs, and the Asian financial 
crisis that occurred in 1997 could serve as an empirical background in which 
varying choices by the firm could be captured. Possibly, the changes in IlMs 
(=IlM2004 – IlM1996) may reflect a better approximation of the firm’s 
choices in varying degrees of IlM practices. The results using the change in 
IlMs were generally the same or slightly better than those that measured 
IlMs only in 2004.
A Graphical Depiction of the Significant Relationships
Using the data from Model 5 in Table 4, I depicted the nature of the signifi-
cant interaction effect found in the analyses. Figure 2 shows how the associa-
tion between employee firm-specific human capital and consummate 
cooperation varies across three different levels (one standard deviation below 
the mean, the mean, and one standard deviation above the mean) of IlMs.
As the graphical depiction suggests (Figure 2), the empirical findings 
resulted in an almost plateau relationship between firm-specific human cap-
ital and consummate cooperation in organizations with stronger IlMs and 
an inverted curvilinear U-shape in organizations with weaker IlMs. The 
peak point of consummate cooperation—where perfunctory cooperation 
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starts to occur—is at a strikingly lower level of firm-specific human capital 
when the firm relies less on IlMs rather than more. When IlMs are perva-
sive for an organization, the point of perfunctory cooperation is slightly 
beyond the range of firm-specific human capital skills on the graph, suggest-
ing that perfunctory cooperation occurs at a point beyond one standard 
deviation above the mean.
Additional Analyses
The current index measure of firm-specific human capital captures both 1) 
positions acquired within the firm and 2) tenure with the current employer. 
given the nature of the index, the unit of the index could be difficult to 
interpret, potentially limiting the practical implications of the study. For this 
reason, instead of using the index to capture firm-specific human capital, I 
ran additional HlM analyses using only tenure with the current employer. 
Unlike the index, the original unit of tenure is interpretable. That is, the 
unit is a year, and the average and the standard deviation of tenure are 6.56 
years and 5.18 years, respectively.
I used standardized values of tenure (with a mean of zero and one for 
standard deviation) for the HlM analyses because centering is required not 
only for HlM analysis (Raudenbush and bryk 2002) but also for a graphical 





















Strong ILM (+1 s.d.) 
Average ILM (mean) 
Weak ILM (–1 s.d.) 
Firm-Specific Human Capital 
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Figure 2. graphical Depiction of the significant Interaction effects between the strength of 
Firm’s IlM and employee Firm-specific Human Capital on Consummate Cooperation
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used standardized values for the index, the use of standardized values for 
tenure allows for an easy comparison of the results. The points of inflection 
at three different levels of IlMs can be still calculated back to the original 
unit, which is a year. The estimated equations and the estimated points of 
inflection at different levels of IlMs using HlM analyses are summarized in 
Table 5 and also graphically depicted in Figure 3.
As seen in Table 5 and Figure 3, on average, the point of inflection where 
perfunctory cooperation occurs is when employees reach approximately 
seven years of tenure. This time frame is slightly above the average tenure 
(6.56 years) in the sample. The points where perfunctory cooperation 
occurs at a weak level of IlMs (–1 sD) and a strong level of IlMs (+1 sD) 
are 3.49 and 10.49 years, respectively. That is, in contrast to firms with weak 
IlMs, firms with strong IlMs under external market pressure can delay per-
functory cooperation by seven years (=10.49 – 3.49).
Discussion
given the increasing external market pressures that firms face, the major 
goal of the current study was to 1) investigate the extent to which firms des-
ert or retain IlM practices and 2) evaluate the merits of retaining IlMs 
through an examination of employee cooperation. I leveraged the context 
of the Asian financial crisis to test whether firms varied in their retention of 
IlMs, and whether in turn, this led to differences in the cooperative behav-
ior of employees.
y = –.10k2 + .15k + 4.35
y = –.10k2 + .02k + 3.98































Strong ILM (+1 s.d.) 
Average ILM (mean)
Weak ILM (–1 s.d.)
Figure 3. Depicting the estimated equations and Points of Inflections When Tenure Is Used 
for Firm-specific Human Capital
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The preceding analysis indicates, first, that the 11 large south korean 
firms studied, which quite uniformly used strong IlMs before the Asian 
financial crisis (lee 1989; Chang 2003; kim and kim 2003), largely deserted 
IlM practices thereafter, suggesting that many have reevaluated the value of 
these practices. Although seniority-based compensation was relatively unaf-
fected, the use of the other three dimensions of IlMs (on-the-job training, 
internal promotion, and long-term employment) clearly eroded soon after 
the Asian financial crisis (1997–2004). Interestingly, however, these firms 
showed considerable variation in their reduction of IlM practices. While 
the average use of IlM practices by these firms clearly fell after the crisis, 
the standard deviation in use also grew substantially. Overall, these firms, 
which employed IlMs in a uniform fashion before the crisis, subsequently 
showed considerable variation in their IlM practices.
With the increase in external market pressures, the general value that 
firms place on firm-specific human capital is likely to fall because it is costly 
to monitor its use and firms may need to focus more on short-term gains. 
This may lead to a rise in agency problems associated with firm-specific 
human capital. given the decreased value of firm-specific human capital, 
there may be less need to monitor its use within firms. And with the lack of 
monitoring, employees may be less prone to utilize acquired firm-specific 
human capital. In addition, a sense of social and psychological breach 
among employees with a high level of firm-specific human capital is likely to 
Table 5. estimating the Points of Inflections When Tenure Is  
Used for Firm-specific Human Capital
The estimated equations
The estimated point of  
inflection (k* or K*1)a
Firms with weak IlMs (one 
standard deviation below the 
mean)
estimated equation:









 ∴ kw* = .758, or
∴Kw* = 6.56 + 5.18·(.758)
          = 10.49 (years)
Firms with average IlMs (mean) estimated equation:









∴ km* = .083, or
∴Kw* = 6.56+5.18·(.083)
          = 6.99 (years)
Firms with strong IlMs (one 
standard deviation above the 
mean)
estimated equation:









∴ ks* = –.592, or 
∴Kw* = 6.56 + 5.18·(–.592)
 = 3.49 (years)
ak* is the normalized value (average = 0; standard deviation = 1) and K* is tenure in its original unit 
(average = 6.56 years; standard deviation = 5.18 years). Thus, the unit of k* is a standard deviation, and 
the unit of K* is a year.
 at University of Kansas Libraries on April 27, 2015ilr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
366 IlR RevIeW
arise if employers signal that this type of intellectual capital is not valued. I 
have argued that without proper incentives and monitoring, job incum-
bents may show a tendency to decrease marginal consummate cooperation 
as their firm-specific human capital increases. The results of the HlM analy-
sis showed inverted-U relationship between firm-specific human capital and 
consummate cooperation. Furthermore, the results indicate that external 
market pressures created a situation in which employees switched their 
mode of cooperation from consummate to perfunctory as they acquired 
additional firm-specific human capital.
The current study highlights two attractive features of IlMs. First, the 
results show that at any given level of firm-specific human capital, the level 
of employee consummate cooperation in firms with stronger IlMs was 
higher than in firms with weaker IlMs. This supports the notion that IlMs 
are well-suited to encourage employee consummate cooperation, as propo-
nents of transaction cost economics have argued (Williamson et al. 1975). 
Accordingly, IlM practices are apt to promote consummate cooperation, 
which can be neither easily measured nor appropriately rewarded in the 
external labor market. Though this has been a central assumption in IlM 
theory, to my knowledge it has not previously been empirically investigated 
or substantiated.
Another attractive feature of IlMs in the face of external market pres-
sures is their ability to delay employee perfunctory cooperation even though 
IlMs do not completely eliminate it. I anticipated that the point at which 
employees stopped increasing their cooperation would be delayed when an 
employer relied relatively more on IlMs. That perfunctory cooperation 
comes at a higher level of firm-specific human capital in organizations with 
stronger IlMs than in those with weaker IlMs is confirmed by the signifi-
cance of the interaction term between IlMs and firm-specific human capi-
tal in the presence of the significant and negatively squared term of 
firm-specific human capital.
I view the contribution of this study to the IlM literature as having a 
number of dimensions. The study documents and measures the extent to 
which firms deserted or retained IlM practices when faced with the shock 
of an economic crisis. Although there have been qualitative descriptions of 
the disintegration of IlMs, few have quantified these changes. In addition, I 
am not aware of any multilevel research testing the effect of internal labor 
markets on employee cooperation, even though the construct “consum-
mate cooperation” is a key variable in Williamson et al.’s (1975) analysis. 
The current study is the first to empirically test whether the strength of a 
firm’s IlM is reliably associated with consummate cooperation at the firm 
and the individual employee level.
The findings of this study also address current debates regarding the rela-
tive benefits of IlMs. The curvilinear relationship between firm-specific 
human capital and consummate cooperation in firms at various levels of 
IlM strength has two main implications. First, advocating the use of IlM 
practices solely on the basis of firm-specific human capital advantages may 
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not be appropriate because it does not take into account the way in which 
information impactedness and agency issues allow employees with higher 
levels of firm-specific human capital to decrease their effort. In the past, 
when this curvilinear relationship and the divergent interests of employers 
and employees were not considered, the advantages of IlMs may have been 
overstated.
second, the study also implies that internal labor market practices still 
remain an attractive option for employers as long as consummate coopera-
tion is an essential ingredient for employee success and survival. The results 
found a significant association between IlM practices and consummate 
cooperation. In addition, a strong IlM employed by a firm was associated 
with a delayed point of perfunctory cooperation.
The current study also provides additional understanding of how workers 
react to varying employer choices in retaining IlM practices in response to 
macroeconomic environmental changes. before the Asian financial crisis, 
large korean firms relied on internal labor markets to a much greater extent 
than did U.s. firms (Cho 2005; Jung and Cheon 2006). Consistent with the 
findings of other studies, this study indicates that overall employment stabil-
ity in korea has deteriorated since the economic crisis, and job security has 
been significantly reduced in many large firms. According to Jung and 
Cheon (2006), white-collar workers in korea who once enjoyed the benefits 
of stable employment are at the front lines of the dramatic change.
One must note the limitations of inference and generalization of the 
results reported here. I examined only 11 firms and have no means of ascer-
taining whether these firms are representative of the south korean national 
economy, let alone the global one. The results may also be occupation- 
specific. They reflect the characteristics of white-collar managers but may 
not go beyond that specific occupational group. Therefore, future research 
may need to replicate this study with other occupational groups. Industry 
characteristics peculiar to the korean setting might also have contributed to 
the findings of this study. Caution against overgeneralizing is warranted. 
Finally, I cannot presume to address the effects of IlM attributes in a differ-
ent societal culture—for example, one with less emphasis on and respect for 
hierarchy or collective values. The sample surveyed was part of the korean 
economy—a specific cultural and economic situation. korea, whose national 
culture is characterized by high levels of collectivism and high power dis-
tance, has a cultural setting that may be consonant with strong IlM attri-
butes. The virtues of IlM practices may be less evident in other national 
cultures. separating the effects of culture from the mechanism of IlMs is an 
important task for future studies. It would be especially meaningful to repli-
cate the study in a Western cultural setting to determine how a different 
culture might affect the relationships investigated in this article.
In conclusion, this study reveals that although the preference for IlMs 
has decreased among firms in the face of external market pressures, firms 
understandably vary greatly in choosing IlMs as a viable option under these 
pressures. The study also reveals that, among employees, agency issues have 
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arisen that are associated with firm-specific human capital in terms of with-
holding consummate cooperation and/or sensing breaches of social/ 
psychological contracts. Most important, however, the efficiency of IlMs in 
obtaining employee consummate cooperation and delaying (rather than 
preventing) employee perfunctory cooperation in the face of external mar-
ket pressure held true.
by highlighting the significant relationships between IlMs and consum-
mate cooperation in an economy hit by external market pressures, the cur-
rent study does not intend to conclude that the lack of overall employee 
consummate cooperation in firms with lower IlM attributes automatically 
puts those firms at a disadvantage. The conclusion depends on the degree 
to which a firm depends on employee cooperation.
What my study suggests is that the efficiency of IlMs in obtaining employee 
consummate cooperation holds true in an economy for which such logic is 
most challenged by external market pressures. However, if one interprets the 
efficiency of internal labor markets from the perspective of generating more 
firm profit than employee cooperation, this article does not provide any 
helpful answers. I am not sure whether consummate cooperation would be 
the best ingredient for firm performance in the globalization of the labor 
market. but to the extent that cooperation based on site-specific knowledge 
remains important, that it must be acquired in a particular context over a 
long period, and that uninhibited and unrestrained application of such 
knowledge rests on faith in a fair and open-ended exchange, IlMs remain an 
option that firms may choose even under globalization.
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